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Abstract: This study is based on data from a three-wave telephone panel survey conducted during
the 1998 governor's race in Florida. The evidence suggests that a considerable amount of issuerelated learning (having to do with candidate policy stands and group endorsements) took place
over the course of the general election campaign, though substantial differences were observed
from one issue area to the next. Further analysis indicates that learning was especially likely to
occur among voters who (a) were more knowledgeable about political affairs to start with
(confirming that the so-called "knowledge gap" may be exacerbated during campaigns); (b)
scored high on a measure of advertising negativity (for one candidate, but not the other); and (c)
early in the campaign, read their local newspaper less frequently. Consistent with prior research,
TV news appears to have done little or nothing to boost issue-based learning among the
electorate.
Note: An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1999 Annual Meetings of the
American Political Science Association.

Democratic theory has never been specific about how much information and knowledge
is needed in order for individuals to be able to fulfill the obligations of effective citizenship.
Most would agree, however, that at a minimum one must have a basic understanding of the
policy differences that exist between candidates for office, and between the parties they
represent. Without such an understanding, the public will be unable to cast its ballots wisely and,
hence, unable to hold elected leaders accountable for their actions. Unfortunately, more than half
a century of empirical research has left the distinct impression that "[v]oters have a limited
amount of information about politics, a limited knowledge of how government works, and a
limited understanding of how governmental actions are connected to consequences of immediate
concern to them" (Popkin, 1991, p. 8).
Much of the knowledge that citizens possess concerning candidate and party differences
is presumably acquired within the context of spirited electoral competition, though some scholars
contend that campaigns "provide little, if any, information to the electorate – and that whatever
information is disseminated by the campaigns is distorted by the mass media and even ignored
by voters" (Alvarez, 1997, p. 7). Indeed, candidates do not always take clear positions or address
the issues of greatest concern to voter (but see Ansolabehere, Snyder, & Stewart 2001; Spiliotes
& Vavreck 2002) and, when this happens, it is hardly surprising that there is a high degree of
confusion and uncertainty about who stands for what. Yet campaigns also provide the single
most "compelling incentive [for the average person] to think about government" (Riker, 1989, p.
1). According to Gelman and King (1993), for example, the instability in public opinion polls
that frequently occurs during presidential elections is a result of information flow; that is, as
voters acquire more information about candidates and issues, and as they incorporate that
information into their decision-making processes, they eventually find themselves able to make
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decisions that are consistent with their political attitudes, beliefs, and interests. It seems likely
that if this type of learning takes place during high-visibility presidential campaigns, then it
should happen in at least some races for lower office as well since most candidates will initially
1

be less familiar to voters than their counterparts at the top of the ticket.

This is the question we address here. Skeptics notwithstanding, numerous studies have
demonstrated that a significant amount of learning about candidate issue positions takes place
during election campaigns (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, & McPhee, 1954; Patterson & McClure, 1976;
Bartels, 1993; Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995; Alvarez, 1997). What is less certain is the extent
to which (a) different media (especially newspapers vs. television news vs. campaign ads)
contribute to such learning; (b) the tone of a campaign (positive vs. negative) affects issue
awareness; and (c) patterns of learning are similar at all levels of electoral competition
(presidential vs. subpresidential). It is our hope that the present study, based on data from a
three-wave panel survey conducted during the 1998 gubernatorial election in Florida, will shed
new light on the ways in which campaigns do or do not provide citizens with the information
they need in order to effectively exercise their most fundamental democratic right.
Sources of Issue Learning in Campaigns
The Medium of Communication
Communication scholars agree that, for most people most of the time, the primary source
of campaign information is the mass media. Despite their usual preoccupation with the horse
race (campaign strategy and poll results; see Sigelman & Bullock, 1991; Just et al., 1996;
Cappella & Jamieson, 1997), and with scandals and candidate gaffes (Sabato, Stencel, & Lichter,
2000), both newspapers and television provide a considerable amount of issue-related
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information to voters. Not everyone would agree, of course. In their landmark study of the 1972
election, Patterson and McClure (1976, p. 54; also see Robinson & Levy, 1986) concluded that
television news "may be fascinating. It may be highly entertaining. But it is simply not
2

informative." As for newspapers, the absence of local coverage in Pittsburgh due to a strike had
no noticeable impact on voter knowledge in the 1992 campaign; the evidence in this case was,
according to Mondak (1995, p. 99), "shattering for any theory of print superiority."
Even less respect is afforded a third channel of campaign communication: paid ads,
which are regarded by many critics as little more than "self-serving puffery and distortion"
(Popkin, 1992, p. 164). Yet campaign ads as a whole contain more issue content than they are
typically given credit for (West, 2001; Geer, 1998); one can even argue that "candidate messages
are almost inextricably about both issues and character at the same time, as they gravitate toward
issues that amplify their self-presentation, and as they stress aspects of their pasts and their
personalities that reinforce their policy concerns" (Just et al., 1996, p. 88). If candidates
sometimes fail to make specific policy commitments in their ads (or other public statements),
they may do so for strategic reasons – or, alternatively, they may be remembering the harsh
treatment often given to politicians who venture beyond the usual sound-bite approach, e.g.,
George McGovern's welfare plan in 1972, or Walter Mondale's 1984 promise to fight the budget
deficit by raising taxes. As Michael Robinson said, "Fresh ideas come out [in the news] sounding
less like new and more like dumb" (cited in Patterson, 1993, p. 159).
The proof, however, is ultimately in the pudding. It may be that a sufficient amount of
issue information exists for voters who pay attention, and that others "know little about issues
because they are uninterested, not because the information is unavailable" (Zhao & Bleske, 1998,
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p. 14). Nevertheless, one of the most critical functions of election campaigns in a democracy is
to educate the public about important issues, and about competing candidates' stands on those
issues. We are interested in gauging the extent to which this happened during the 1998 campaign
for governor in Florida. Regardless of whether the informational glass is judged to have been
half-empty or half-full, did voters exhibit greater awareness of candidate positioning at the end
of the campaign than at the beginning? And if so, can the increase be linked to voters' differential
levels of attentiveness to campaign coverage in the newspapers or on TV, to paid ads, or to some
combination of these?

3

While we know from prior research that a certain amount of learning takes place during
4

campaigns, there is no consensus as to the relative contribution of different communication
channels to that learning. Some studies suggest that voters learn more from reading newspapers
than from watching television news programs and that, in fact, the latter adds little or nothing to
one's ability to place candidates on key issues (Patterson & McClure, 1976; Patterson, 1980;
Robinson & Levy, 1986; Choi & Becker, 1987; Berkowitz & Pritchard, 1989; Weaver & Drew,
1993). Others indicate that TV news may be a significant source of issue awareness after all
(Chaffee & Schleuder, 1986; Neuman, Just, & Crigler, 1992; Bartels, 1993; Chaffee, Zhao, &
5

Leshner, 1994; Weaver & Drew, 1995, 2001; Zhao & Chaffee, 1995; Graber, 2001).

And then there are studies which raise the possibility that campaign ads convey at least as
much issue information to voters as do newspapers and television. Patterson and McClure (1976,
pp. 116-117), for example, found that "[o]n every single issue emphasized in presidential
commercials [in 1972], persons with high exposure to television advertising showed a greater
increase in knowledge [about the candidates' positions] than persons with low exposure." Survey
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data from a Michigan congressional district in 1974 revealed that voters' awareness of candidates
and their issue positions was enhanced by both television and radio advertising (Atkin & Heald,
1976). Brians and Wattenberg (1996) reported that, at least in the latter stages of the 1992
presidential race, ad watchers were better informed about candidates' issue positions than either
newspaper readers or TV news watchers; the obvious conclusion seemed to be that "political
advertising contributes to a well-informed electorate" (p. 185). Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1995),
using an experimental design, also obtained results that run counter to conventional wisdom:
"Though political advertisements are generally ridiculed as a serious form of campaign
communication," they observed, "our results demonstrate that they enlighten voters and enable
them to take account of issues and policies when choosing between the candidates" (p. 59).
Not everyone is ready to jump on the campaign ad bandwagon. The results of a 1992
two-wave panel survey in North Carolina led Zhao and Bleske (1998; also see Zhao & Bleske,
1995) to conclude that respondents who paid more attention to ads tended to learn less about
candidates' issue positions. This finding may have been anomalous, or it may provide "one case
in which some members of the advertising audience [were] misled and their issue learning
hindered. It supports critics' distrust of political commercials and also supports the [emergence
of] professional 'ad watchers' who monitor and expose misinformation" (Zhao & Bleske, 1998, p.
27). Such a result reminds us that ads, like newspapers and TV news, are likely to have a greater
effect under some conditions than under others (Drew & Weaver, 1998). Researchers have yet to
determine with any degree of precision which conditions enhance the ability of which media to
facilitate voter learning during campaigns.
The Tone of Political Advertising
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While the literature on negative advertising has expanded exponentially in recent years
(e.g., Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995; Johnson-Cartee & Copeland, 1991; Lau & Pomper, 2004;
Sigelman & Kugler, 2003), relatively little attention has been given to the question of how
advertising tone affects campaign learning. An exception is Brians and Wattenberg (1996), in
which people who recalled seeing negative ads during the 1992 presidential race were
significantly more likely than those who did not to be aware of the candidates' issue positions.
Many voters claim not to like negative campaigning and consider it to be misleading and/or
6

unethical (Garramone, 1984; Just et al., 1996; Pinkleton, 1997; but see Hill, 1989), and yet
candidates continue to employ attack strategies because of their presumed effectiveness in
helping to win elections.
We will not be addressing this question directly in the present study (for a review, see
Lau, Sigelman, Heldman, & Babbitt, 1999; also Lau & Pomper, 2004). Instead, our concern here
has to do with whether negative advertising is more or less likely than positive advertising to
facilitate issue learning during election campaigns. When either type of ad contains information
about the policy positions of candidates, to what degree is that information received and
assimilated by the target audience? Voters themselves do not consider negative ads to be
especially helpful (Pinkleton & Garramone, 1992), but the jury remains out. As previously noted,
Brians and Wattenberg (1996) discovered a significant relationship between recall of negative
ads and issue awareness in their analysis of the 1992 American National Election Study.
Similarly, an analysis of Senate elections between 1988-92 led Kahn and Kenney (2000) to
conclude that negative advertising is especially important in helping voters to accumulate
information about challengers. In controlled experiments, however, Ansolabehere and Iyengar
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(1995; also see Geer & Geer, 2003) found positive and negative ads to be equally informative.
Thus, what is probably the strongest justification for negative advertising (i.e., that it
provides information without which it would be "much more difficult for the voters to make
intelligent choices about the people they elect to public office"; Mayer, 1996, p. 450) is based
upon an assumption that may or may not be true. There are indications that the issue content of
political advertising as a whole, and presumably of negative ads in particular, has increased in
recent years (West, 2001). We therefore hypothesize, first, that campaign ads will make a
contribution to voter issue awareness independently of any learning that results from exposure
7

(or attention ) to campaign coverage in the newspapers or on television. Second, regardless of
the processes involved – e.g., that negative ads are more frequently recalled (Shapiro & Rieger,
1992; Brians & Wattenberg, 1996); that they contain more issue information than positive ads
(Kaid & Johnston, 1991; Geer, 2000; West, 2001); that negative information is given greater
weight than positive information (Lau, 1985) and is thus more helpful in assisting voters to
discriminate between the candidates (Garramone, Atkin, Pinkleton, & Cole, 1990); or that
negative ads heighten feelings of anxiety which, in turn, cause voters to seek out more
information about candidates' policy stands or other attributes (Marcus & MacKuen, 1993) – we
expect to find that increases in issue awareness over the course of a campaign are more closely
associated with exposure to negative rather than positive advertisements.
Data and Measures
The present study uses data from a three-wave telephone panel survey conducted by the
8

Florida Voter polling organization during the 1998 campaign for governor of Florida. Our
initial interviews (late July-early August) were with 628 individuals, randomly chosen from a list
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of all registered voters living in Broward (including Fort Lauderdale) and south Palm Beach
Counties in the southeastern part of the state. Wave two interviews (N = 402) were completed in
late September-early October, wave three (N = 301, 47.9 percent of the original group) in
November beginning on election night. The results reported below are limited to the 301
respondents who participated in all three waves.

9

Most of the research reviewed earlier is based on the analysis of either cross-sectional
surveys (which do not take into account the amount of information that people bring to the
campaign and, hence, do not allow for measurement of individual-level change) or experimental
data (which cannot fully capture the dynamics of a real-life campaign). Most of it also centers on
presidential elections, where trends and relationships may vary from what one would find in
races for congressional, state, and local office. Our study is hardly unique in its use of panel data
(Berelson, Lazarsfeld, & McPhee, 1954; Patterson & McClure 1976; Patterson, 1980; Bartels,
1993), in the fact that issue learning is examined within the context of an actual campaign below
the level of president (Atkin & Heald, 1974; Choi & Becker, 1987; Weaver & Drew, 1993; West,
1994; Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995; Zhao & Bleske, 1995; Kahn & Kenney, 1999), or even in
the inclusion of three potential sources of learning during campaigns: newspapers, TV news, and
paid ads (Patterson & McClure, 1976; Berkowitz & Pritchard, 1989; Weaver & Drew, 1993;
Brians & Wattenberg, 1996; Just et al., 1996; Alvarez, 1997). On the plus side, though, we also
are able to compare the impact of positive and negative ads and, because our panel encompasses
three waves, to determine whether issue learning is more likely to take place early or later in the
campaign (Brians & Wattenberg, 1996; Holbrook, 1999). Moreover, this study is one of the few
to look at gubernatorial politics (see Choi & Becker, 1987; Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995), a
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level of electoral competition that is in some ways similar to, but in other ways quite different
from, the race for the White House.
None of the above is intended to suggest that our approach is without shortcomings. First,
there is the fact that we employ survey data alone, i.e., relying solely on respondent self-reports
of exposure and attention to various media, and to negative vs. positive information as conveyed
by campaign ads (Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1996; Iyengar & Simon, 2000). Second, the focus on
a single community raises some obvious concerns about the extent to which our findings can be
generalized to other settings – though, traditionally, panel studies of media effects have relied on
local samples (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, & McPhee, 1954; Patterson & McClure, 1976) in order to
control respondents' media environments. Third, a potentially serious problem in any panel
survey is that which stems from the inevitable process of respondent mortality. As previously
noted, less than half of our original sample participated in all three waves. If the
sociodemographic and political characteristics of this group differed markedly from those of the
individuals we interviewed at wave one, then our results and conclusions would be called into
question. Fortunately, this did not happen. Not only did the final panel have substantially the
same characteristics as the original sample in all important categories (including age, education,
gender, race, and party identification) but, perhaps equally important, its choice for governor was
10

within two percentage points of the actual outcome.
Election Backdrop: Bush vs. MacKay

The early front-runner for governor in 1998 was Miami businessman Jeb Bush, son of
former President George Bush (and younger brother of the president-to-be), who had run for and
lost the same office four years earlier by the closest margin in Florida's history. Although making
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only his second bid for elective office, that earlier campaign and, no doubt, his family ties gave
Bush an extremely high profile among voters: Statewide polls showed his name recognition level
to be consistently above 90 percent during the year leading up to the election. Bush's opponent
was Democratic Lieutenant Governor Buddy MacKay, a former congressman and loser (also in
an incredibly close contest) in his 1988 U. S. Senate race against Connie Mack. In Florida, the
lieutenant governor is elected on a ticket with the governor and has no formal constitutional role
apart from replacing the latter in case of death or incapacity – which is exactly what MacKay
did (briefly) following the sudden death of Governor Lawton Chiles in December 1998.
Although less of a sure thing than Bush, MacKay entered the election year as his party's
undisputed leader for the gubernatorial nomination; the obscurity of his office notwithstanding,
he had name recognition in the 80-percent range (91 percent in wave one of our Broward-south
Palm Beach survey).
Both candidates escaped a primary challenge, and neither had begun any individual
campaign advertising prior to the first survey in July-August.

11

As a result, the situation in late

summer was one in which the candidates were personally well-known, but their positions on the
issues were not. As prior research (especially at the presidential level; see Bartels, 1988 and
1993; Patterson, 1980; Popkin, 1991) has shown, many voters obtain a considerable amount of
information during the prenomination phase, and surveys that do not begin until the general
election are unable to capture the issue-based (or other) learning that may already have taken
place. In principle, our study is problematic in this regard. Yet with no serious primary
competition on either side, and with most campaigning prior to Labor Day being of the "inside
politics" variety, one could anticipate that voter awareness of the policy positions of these two
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extremely well-known public figures would be limited. As we shall see momentarily, it was.
Our sampling area (coinciding with the circulation market of our sponsor, the South
Florida Sun-Sentinel) included all of Broward County and portions of south Palm Beach County.
In 1998, over 900,000 of the estimated 1.7 million residents were registered to vote, most as
Democrats (53 percent vs. 34 percent Republican). Considering its size, the media market is
somewhat limited. Broward County, which makes up the largest portion of our study area, has no
television stations of its own; instead, residents must rely on TV news from Miami and, in some
parts of the county, Palm Beach. Although these non-local stations regularly cover developments
in Broward, such stories frequently take a back seat to reporting on events closer to home. As for
print, the region is served principally by two major newspapers: the Sun-Sentinel and, to a lesser
extent, the Miami Herald. Both papers are fairly traditional in their approach to news coverage,
and both contained numerous stories relating to the 1998 race for governor.
Dependent Variables: Issue and Group Support Awareness
Our analysis centers upon two separate aspects of issue-related learning among voters. The
most familiar of these is a battery of questions that was introduced as follows:
Next, I'm going to read a brief series of statements. After each, I'd like you to tell me
which of the two major candidates for governor, Buddy MacKay or Jeb Bush, is more
likely to favor the statement, if you happen to know. Let's start with "thinks we don't
need any more gun control laws." Do you think MacKay or Bush is more likely to
favor this position, or don't you know?
The gun control query (correct answer: Bush) was followed by six others: "supports vouchers for
students in underperforming public schools" (Bush), "wants to guarantee that 40 percent of the
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state budget goes to public education" (MacKay), "believes that a woman should have the right
to have an abortion in most instances" (MacKay), "wants patients to have the right to sue their
HMO when they're denied proper care" (MacKay), "has pledged not to raise taxes" (MacKay),
and "wants to appoint a statewide drug czar to fight drug abuse" (Bush).
Our challenge in preparing this list was to identify, in advance of the public campaign,
(1) issues that one side or the other, or perhaps both, could be expected to emphasize in their
communications with voters (directly via ads, and indirectly through print and broadcast media);
12

as well as (2) issues on which the two candidates offered a relatively clear-cut choice.

Five of

the seven issues we selected ended up meeting these standards to a greater or lesser degree.
Bush's proposal for a drug czar was something of a trial balloon; it came and went with scarcely
any notice being paid by the press or by the MacKay camp. Also, both candidates (for strategic
reasons) handled the no-new-taxes pledge fairly quietly, and in a manner not entirely consistent
with their respective parties' images. It is therefore not surprising that neither of these items
scaled with the others in an index of issue awareness.
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A second set of questions was included in the survey, relating to group bases of support
for the two candidates:
Now I'm going to ask you if you happen to know which groups and organizations are
currently supporting either Buddy MacKay or Jeb Bush for governor. The first is
police organizations – do you think they are supporting Buddy MacKay or Jeb Bush,
or is this something you're not sure about?
In addition to law enforcement (correct answer: Bush), respondents were asked to name the
candidate supported by teacher organizations (MacKay), environmentalists (MacKay), the
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Christian Coalition and other conservative religious groups (Bush), and tobacco companies
(Bush).

14

Our intent was partly to have surrogates in place for issues (or clusters of issues) that

had not yet emerged at wave one but might arise later in the campaign, e.g., school prayer,
credentials for teachers in public schools, environmental problems related to the Everglades or
other ecologically sensitive areas, and so on; in each instance, we expected that the candidates'
15

positions would be relatively clear and predictably different from one another.

Apart from specific (and often short-term) issues, however, prior research has shown that
voters tend to associate the Republican and Democratic parties and their leaders with particular
sociopolitical groups and organizations – associations which stem from the tendency for each
party, over time, consistently to represent the interests and policy views of certain segments of
society better than others (Craig, Martinez, & Kane, 1999). Many voters will be aware of these
party-group linkages regardless of whether or not there is a campaign under way, just as they
will know that one prospective candidate for president or governor favors Policy A while another
prefers Policy B. But for the electorate as a whole, the level of awareness should increase as
more cues become available from the media or from candidates themselves. We therefore
combined the five items described above in an index of group support awareness that was
16

expected to behave, for the most part, in the same fashion as our measure of issue awareness.

The frequency of accurate candidate-issue and candidate-group associations is shown in
17

Table 1 (which includes both actual and corrected percentages ). In Table 2, we display the
magnitude of change occurring between each of the waves. Several observations are in order.
First, except for abortion (which was a major issue in the 1994 governor's race when Jeb Bush
ran against Lawton Chiles, and which voters clearly perceive as being a point of division
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between the parties; see Adams, 1997), fewer than half – and usually fewer than one-third based
upon corrected estimates – of all respondents at the beginning of the campaign were able to
connect any policy stand with the candidate taking it. Similarly, the Christian Coalition "and
other conservative religious groups" (which had been strongly in Bush's corner four years earlier)
was the only instance where a majority could successfully link a group with the candidate that
group was supporting. Thus, as we already have pointed out, the candidates for governor in 1998
were well-known by the electorate, but in a relatively superficial way.
Tables 1 and 2 about here
This changed somewhat as the campaign unfolded. Among our five issues, the greatest
amount of learning was evident for school vouchers: By November, 79.4 percent (corrected)
knew that Jeb Bush advocated the use of vouchers – a huge increase of 44.6 points over the
preceding three months. And even though many voters knew at the start where Bush and
MacKay stood on abortion, a considerable amount of learning (20.2 points corrected) took place
there as well. The other three issues (especially education and patient rights) saw more modest
improvements in voter awareness, which is hardly surprising given that they did not receive
nearly as much attention from the media and candidates as did vouchers and abortion.
Among group support awareness variables, the biggest gains by far occurred for police
organizations: In wave one of the survey, respondents were equally likely to name Bush and
MacKay (16.9 percent each, for a corrected total of exactly zero) as the preferred candidate of
official law enforcement; by November, a respectable 54.5 percent (corrected) knew that the
GOP standard bearer had received the endorsement of the Police Benevolent Association and
similar organizations. With the Bush campaign having saturated the state's airwaves with a series
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of ads attacking MacKay for being soft on crime, we anticipate that this may be one area where
issue-related learning is directly and substantially related to one's attentiveness to those ads.
The remaining four group associations exhibited less change. A majority of voters (51.8
percent corrected) knew in July-August that the religious right was supporting Bush, and only
7.7 percent were added to that number over the ensuing three months; total gains were not much
higher for teachers (14.3 points corrected) and environmentalists (11.0 points). Apart from law
enforcement, the greatest amount of learning occurred for tobacco companies: 60.9 percent
(corrected) naming Bush as the favored candidate in wave three, up 22.0 points from our initial
survey. This is somewhat puzzling since tobacco did not play a prominent role in the 1998
governor's race. It was in the news, however, because of an enormous out-of-court settlement
between tobacco companies and the state government (the former having been sued by the
latter), and because of the ensuing controversy over how much of that settlement should be part
of the fee paid to attorneys (traditionally a Democratic group) who had represented the state on a
contingency basis. Perhaps these events led some voters to conclude that tobacco companies
were behind Bush; or, more simply, it may have been a case of people applying longstanding
party stereotypes (Rahn, 1993), i.e., big business is usually pro-Republican, so big tobacco must
be pro-Republican in Florida. Still, even if the latter is true, the campaign appears to have played
at least some role in activating those stereotypes for many individuals.
Independent Variables
Results so far demonstrate that learning did occur during the 1998 gubernatorial
campaign in Florida. Our next task is to estimate the relative contributions made by news
coverage and paid ads (both positive and negative) to that learning. Along with Price and Zaller
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(1993) and others, we agree that being exposed to the news is not the same as "getting" it – and
that by relying solely on self-reports of exposure (or surrogates such as education), survey-based
studies may underestimate the effects of mass media on citizens' attitudes and perceptions. Thus,
as an indirect measure of "habitual news reception" (Zaller, 1996), the analysis below also
18

employs a six-item index of general political knowledge as one of our independent variables.

Further, we have attempted to distinguish between mere exposure and "attention" to
media news coverage and campaign ads (assuming that attention would have a greater impact on
issue learning). Respondents were asked in wave one to indicate how many days in the past week
they had read a daily newspaper, and how many days they had watched the local news on TV.
Against this backdrop of exposure, they were asked in waves two and three (1) how much
attention (from a great deal to none) they had been paying to news on TV and radio about the
campaign for governor;

19

(2) whether they had read about the campaign in a newspaper and, if

so, how much attention they had been paying to newspaper articles about it; (3) whether in the
past few weeks they recalled seeing or hearing any Bush ads on TV or radio and, if so, how
much attention they had been paying to them; and (4) whether they recalled seeing any MacKay
ads and, if so, how much attention they had been paying. The last two items (r = .71 at t2 and .70
at t3) were used to create a simple additive index tapping overall attentiveness to campaign ads.
Our analysis also includes measures of interest in the campaign and in "government and
public affairs" generally, as well as party identification (the standard 7-point scale), partisan
strength (combining strong Democrats with strong Republicans, weak Democrats with weak
Republicans, and so on), and demographics (gender, education, age, race). Finally, perceptions
of campaign negativity were captured in waves two and three with the following questions:

17
As you know, some campaigns are mostly positive, that is, candidates talking about
their own record and qualifications – but others are mostly negative, that is,
candidates criticizing something about their opponent. Overall, would you say that
the Bush campaign for governor this year has been very positive, somewhat positive,
somewhat negative, or very negative? What about the MacKay campaign for
governor – overall, would you say that it has been very positive, somewhat positive,
somewhat negative, or very negative?
20

Scores on each of these items ranged from 1 (very positive) to 5 (very negative).
Results

Our first pass through the data is presented in Table 3, where the variables to be
explained are issue and group support awareness in wave one (July-August). As noted earlier,
these results provide a snapshot of the electorate before Bush and MacKay started airing their
TV and radio spots, and before news coverage of the campaign was as prominent as it would
later become. Using binomial generalized linear models with a logit link function Gill, 2001), we
see essentially the same pattern in both instances: statistically significant coefficients indicating
higher levels of substantive knowledge among individuals who were well-informed about and
interested in politics generally, who exhibited a high degree of interest in the nascent campaign,
who possessed a strong attachment to one of the parties, and who watched television relatively
21

infrequently.

In essence, politicized voters, especially if they also were partisan and watched

less local news on TV (but regardless of how often they read the newspaper), were more
knowledgeable voters in the campaign's initial stages.
Table 3 about here
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Results in Table 4 are for waves two (September-October) and three (November). We
follow common practice here in employing three sets of independent variables: (1) one's prior
scores on issue or group support awareness (t1 in the first two columns, t2 in the next two); (2)
several other first-wave measures including exposure to newspapers and TV news, political
knowledge, general interest in politics, direction and strength of partisanship, gender, age,
education, and race; and most importantly, (3) contemporaneous measures of attention to the
campaign in newspapers and on television, overall level of attention to paid ads on radio and TV,
perceived negativity of the Bush and MacKay campaigns, and in wave three an item indicating
exposure to the single debate that was held (and broadcast on both TV and radio) between the
two contenders. With wave-one factors (or wave-two as appropriate) in the equation, regression
coefficients can be interpreted as representing the impact of an independent variable on changes
in the dependent variable over the course of the general election campaign (Markus, 1979).
Table 4 about here
Not surprisingly, prior levels of issue and group support awareness are the best predictors
of an individual's scores on these same variables as measured in waves two and three. Among the
other variables displayed in Table 4, political knowledge has the most consistent effect on issuerelated learning, i.e., those who knew more about current events initially tended to acquire more
22

information during the campaign.

In addition, negative advertising by Bush is significant in

three of our four models (greater perceived negativity being associated with higher levels of
learning), as is newspaper exposure in both wave-two equations (less learning occurring among
voters who frequently read the newspaper, though this relationship is no longer evident in the
campaign's closing days).
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Attentiveness to the campaign as reported either in the newspaper or on local TV news
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programs, perceived MacKay negativity, and debate exposure

have no discernable impact on

learning, while the coefficient for attention to the candidates' TV ads approaches conventional
levels of significance (p ≤ .10) only for issue awareness and only in wave three; to the extent that
simple exposure to TV news, interest in the campaign and in politics generally, and partisan
strength exert an influence, it is indirect, i.e., operating through the effects these variables have
on initial levels of issue and group support awareness (see Table 3). Demographic factors play a
limited role, though two of them (education and age) are associated with the learning of group
support in one of the waves. While calculating the difference between null deviance and residual
deviance at the bottom of Table 4 indicates a decent overall fit for our model (Gill, 2001), it is
clear that the data presented here do not tell us everything that we would like to know about the
origins of individual differences in issue-related learning during the 1998 gubernatorial
campaign in Florida.
Conclusion
Very few citizens know where each candidate stands on every important issue that might
arise over the course of an election year. As Popkin (1992, p. 168) explained, "[c]ampaigns are
blunt instruments, not scalpels. They are for ratifying broad changes in direction that have been
worked out between campaigns or for rejecting incumbents and their policies. The reformist
hope that campaigns can raise new and complicated issues or bring Americans to a deeper
understanding of the most complex issues facing the country is misguided." Nevertheless,
campaigns do inform. The findings presented here are consistent with a great deal of prior
research which suggests that learning takes place – not on every issue perhaps, nor in every
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electoral contest, but certainly in those instances where candidates talk about policy, and about
the similarities and differences between themselves and their parties on those issues. Such was
the case in Florida's race for governor in 1998. Were voters as well-informed as democratic
theory suggests they might have been? Of course not. Were they better informed in November
than they had been in late summer? Absolutely, and by a considerable margin on some issues.
As to the factors that help to shape issue-related learning, our results raise serious doubts
about the centrality of the mass media; if anything, exposure to newspapers and local TV news
had a negative impact (the latter indirectly) in the Bush-MacKay contest, while attentiveness to
campaign coverage in either medium appears not to have affected learning at all. What mattered
most was general political knowledge and prior awareness of candidate issue stands and sources
of group support, with the informationally rich becoming even richer as the flow of information
increased over time. In addition, the oft-maligned negative campaign provided a boost to the
levels of substantive knowledge exhibited by some voters; specifically, although overall attention
to paid ads had no effect on learning, perceptions of Bush (but not MacKay) negativity were
associated with issue awareness in late September/early October, and with both issue and group
support awareness in our post-election survey. For whatever reason – e.g., that they were more
memorable, more informative, more frequently aired, or more effective at engaging people's
emotions and stimulating their desire to learn – Bush's attacks appear to have had a greater
impact than did the candidate's positive message (or, for that matter, MacKay's messages both
pro and con). Negative campaigning isn't always a good thing but, when it helps voters to learn
what they must know in order to cast an informed ballot, neither should we judge it to be without
any redeeming value.

21
In conclusion, this study suggests that some (though by no means all) of the same
dynamics that are evident in presidential elections may apply in high-level subpresidential
contests as well. Future research should examine campaigns for a broader range of offices, while
also looking more closely at alternative communications channels – including direct mail, which
is a crucial element in many state and local races. Finally, we encourage researchers to continue
trying to develop improved measures of media attentiveness and campaign negativity. Until we
have a better idea about the kinds of messages voters encounter over the course of a campaign,
our estimates of the impact of those messages (on learning, candidate choice, or anything else)
will necessarily be problematic.
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Notes
1. Along these lines, people appear to learn more from presidential debates about
candidates with whom they are relatively unfamiliar (Holbrook, 1999, p. 79).
2. For their part, the American public rates the performance of the news media generally,
and TV news in particular, as "adequate," i.e., "neither an abysmal failure [n]or a tremendous
success" in terms of its political coverage (Dautrich & Hartley, 1999, p. 90).
3. Among the potentially important sources of campaign learning not considered here are
magazines (Robinson & Levy, 1986; Neuman, Just, & Crigler, 1992), so-called "nontraditional
media" (Hollander, 1995; Weaver & Drew, 1995), opinion leaders (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, &
Gaudet, 1948), direct mail advertising (Weaver-Lariscy & Tinkham, 1996; Vavreck, Spiliotes, &
Fowler, 2002), and campaign events of one sort or another (Holbrook, 1996; Shaw, 1999); radio
news (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, & McPhee, 1954; Weaver & Drew, 1993) will not be examined
separately but rather in combination with its TV counterpart (see note 24). In addition to the
factors discussed above, our analysis will assess the impact of candidate debates on learning.
4. Despite a higher proportion of ads stressing personal traits rather than issues (Geer,
1998), such learning is especially likely to take place during primaries (Bartels, 1988; Popkin,
1991) when candidates, and their policy views, are less known to begin with (also see note 1). As
a result, our focus on the general election poses a somewhat sterner test of the learning
hypothesis than might otherwise be the case.
5. Some scholars contend that neither newspapers nor TV news facilitates learning to any
appreciable degree (Price & Zaller, 1993) or, alternatively (and perhaps most plausibly), that it
depends less on the medium per se than on the content of the message being delivered (Norris &
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Sanders, 2003).
6. Even if attack ads are not generally popular among voters, some types of attacks are
regarded as more legitimate than others (e.g., Johnson-Cartee & Copeland, 1989, 1997; Green &
Rourke, 2000).
7. Exposure and attention obviously are not the same thing (Chaffee & Schleuder, 1986;
Zhao & Bleske, 1995; Brians & Wattenberg, 1996; also see Price & Zaller, 1993; Zaller, 1996).
While many studies use measures of the former, it is the latter that should have the stronger
impact on issue learning or almost any other attitude and/or behavior that might be of interest to
communication scholars.
8. The panel was commissioned by the South Florida Sun-Sentinel, whom the authors wish to
thank for their generous support of this project. Additional information can be obtained from
Florida Voter directly (954-584-0204), or from the Graduate Program in Political Campaigning
in the Political Science Department at the University of Florida (352-392-0262).
9. While respondent mortality contributes to an increased margin of error (plus or minus
5.6 points, compared with 3.9 for the original sample), an N of 301 cases is sufficient to meet the
required assumptions of the estimating procedures employed in our analysis. One might wonder
whether participation not only in one but in three surveys may have sensitized some respondents
to the campaign and caused them to be more attentive than they otherwise would have been to
issue information about the candidates. Fortunately, the patterns of learning reported below in
Tables 1 and 2 suggest that this was not a serious problem (cf. Bartels, 2000). First, there were
some issue areas where the levels of information were only slightly higher at the end of the
campaign than at the beginning; thus, any sensitizing that took place was selective in its impact.
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Second, most learning took place between waves two and three of our survey, but on at least two
issues (education and patient rights) it happened earlier; we consider it unlikely that the
experience of being interviewed would have encouraged respondents to seek out information
about different issues at different times.
10. One difference that emerged had to do with the tendency for less-informed people to drop
out of panel surveys at disproportionately high rates (Price & Zaller, 1993). Consistent with this
pattern, members of our panel scored significantly higher than other respondents on measures of
general political knowledge, interest in government and public affairs, and interest in the campaign
for governor; they also were very likely to have made it to the polls on election day (92 percent selfreported turnout). The two groups had roughly equal levels of formal education, however.
11. The Republican Party did broadcast a number of so-called "party-building" ads, most of
which centered around Jeb Bush and his family (and lacked any real issue content).
12. "Relatively clear" does not necessarily mean "polar opposite." For example, Bush
endorsed higher spending for public education but refused to commit to the 40 percent share of the
state budget urged by MacKay.
13. Alpha for this index (scored as the number of correct candidate placements out of five
possible) was .67 in wave one, .66 in wave two, and .62 in wave three. Apart from their failure to
scale, the omitted items showed little or no evidence of voter learning during the campaign.
14. Some of these connections (MacKay and teachers) were stronger and more explicit than
others (Bush and tobacco).
15. As it happened, none of the issue types listed here became major points of contention
during the campaign.
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16. Alpha was .72 in wave one, .72 in wave two, and .64 in wave three. As with issue
awareness, scores were determined by the number of correct identifications made by respondents
out of five possible.
17. The second, fourth, and sixth columns in Tables 1 and 2 are based on percentages that
include a correction for guessing. This correction was calculated as the percent wrong subtracted
from the percent right, setting aside those who say they don't know; cf. Patterson (1980).
18. Respondents were asked to name the job held by Janet Reno (U. S. attorney general), the
branch of government whose responsibility it is to determine whether a law is constitutional, which
party has the most members in the U. S. House and in the Florida state legislature (Republicans),
how much of a majority is required in each chamber for Congress to override a presidential veto,
and which party is more conservative than the other at the national level. Alpha was .61 for this
scale, which was asked in its entirety only in wave one of our survey.
19. One might wonder whether we have confused matters by asking about TV and radio
together (both here in terms of news coverage, and also with regard to campaign ads). The truth is
that not many respondents relied on radio for political information: Asked where they got most of
their "news and information about state and local politics," 42.5 percent said television, 39.9 percent
local newspapers, 6.6 percent radio, and 3.3 percent friends and family. Nevertheless, it is clear that
what we are testing with these measures is the impact of attention to TV and radio (or electronic
media generally) rather than to television alone.
20. The frequent divergence of subjective and objective measures of campaign tone is noted
by Sigelman and Kugler (2003). In wave two, Bush's ads were judged (in the aggregate) to have
been slightly more negative than positive, and MacKay's ads slightly more positive than negative. In
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the third wave, each candidate's ads were characterized as negative by roughly sixty percent of those
offering an opinion.
21. The figures in Table 3 also show more information possessed by Democratic identifiers
(issue awareness) and older voters (group support awareness). The impact of age is relative: Our
sampling area and, consequently, our panel contain a large number of older voters, and so it is
not young people in an absolute sense, but rather those under age fifty who were most
knowledgeable about the organizations supporting each candidate.
22. This would seem to support the idea that campaigns serve to widen the "awareness
gap," with the informationally rich becoming even richer due to increased communication flow
(see Holbrook, 2002 for a review; also Moore, 1987; Zaller, 1992; Price & Zaller, 1993;
Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995). Some studies, however, report that exposure to campaigns, or to
the news media generally, have the potential to promote larger knowledge gains among the least
informed (and/or the least engaged, least educated, and least socioeconomically well-off; see
Alvarez, 1997; Eveland & Scheufele, 2000; Rhine, Bennett, & Flickinger, 2001; Holbrook, 2002;
Norris & Sanders, 2003).
23. Slightly more than half of our respondents reported having seen or (less often) heard
the debate. By a margin of about 2-to-1, they judged Jeb Bush to have been the winner. While
the null finding here is at odds with much prior research on the topic (e.g., Holbrook, 1999; Just,
Crigler, & Wallach, 1990; Weaver & Drew, 1995; Drew & Weaver, 1998; Druckman, 2003), one
limitation of most of these studies (an exception is Holbrook, 2002) is that the models tested fail
to control for other sources of learning such as exposure to news media or TV ads.
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Table 1
Learning in the 1998 Florida Governor's Race

A.

B.

Issue Awareness

Wave One
Percent Corrected

Wave Two
Percent Corrected

Wave Three
Percent Corrected

Gun Laws
School Vouchers
Education
Abortion
Patient Rights

43.2
42.2
39.5
59.8
48.2

46.8
62.1
47.2
66.3
58.0

63.3
79.4
54.1
81.1
63.2

Group Support Awareness

Wave One
Percent Corrected
16.9
0.0
47.8
38.5
44.9
35.3
56.5
51.8
46.5
38.9

Police
Teachers
Environmentalists
Christian Coalition
Tobacco Companies

29.9
23.3
22.2
52.5
33.6

31.8
43.8
32.5
55.0
42.7

Wave Two
Percent Corrected
26.7
14.4
49.3
41.3
42.9
32.6
56.5
49.5
47.8
40.8

45.8
67.9
33.2
72.7
45.0

Wave Three
Percent Corrected
66.7
54.5
65.0
52.8
59.9
46.3
67.3
59.5
66.7
60.9

Source: South Florida Sun-Sentinel panel survey of registered voters, July-November 1998 (N = 301).
Note: The first set of entries for each wave indicates the percentage of all panel respondents who matched the appropriate candidate with a
policy position or group endorsement. The second set of entries presents these percentages corrected for guessing (see text).
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Table 2
Magnitude of Change (Learning) in the 1998 Florida Governor's Race

A.

Issue Awareness

Gun Laws
School Vouchers
Education
Abortion
Patient Rights

B.

Group Support Awareness
Police
Teachers
Environmentalists
Christian Coalition
Tobacco Companies

Wave One-Wave Two
Percent Corrected
3.6
19.9
7.7
6.5
9.8

1.9
20.5
10.3
2.5
9.1

Wave One-Wave Two
Percent Corrected
9.8
14.4
1.5
2.8
- 2.0
- 2.7
0.0
- 2.3
1.3
1.9

Wave Two-Wave Three
Percent Corrected
16.5
17.3
6.9
14.8
5.2

14.0
24.1
0.7
17.7
2.3

Wave Two-Wave Three
Percent Corrected
40.0
40.1
15.7
11.5
17.0
13.7
10.8
10.0
18.9
20.1

Wave One-Wave Three
Percent Corrected
20.1
37.2
14.6
21.3
15.0

15.9
44.6
11.0
20.2
11.4

Wave One-Wave Three
Percent Corrected
49.8
54.5
17.2
14.3
15.0
11.0
10.8
7.7
20.2
22.0

Source: South Florida Sun-Sentinel panel survey of registered voters, July-November 1998 (N = 301).
Note: Table entries indicate change in the proportion of respondents who match the appropriate candidate with a policy position or group
endorsement. The first set of entries for each of the three time intervals is based on actual percentages, the second set on percentages
corrected for guessing (see text and Table 1).
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Table 3
Predicting Issue and Group Support Awareness in Wave One

Newspaper Exposure
TV News Exposure
Political Knowledge
Campaign Interest
General Political Interest
Partisan Strength
Party ID/Republican
Party ID/Democrat
Gender/Female
Age
Education
Race/Black

Constant
Null deviance
Residual deviance
N

Issue
Awareness

Group Support
Awareness

.024
(.016)
-.050*
(.019)
.272*
(.029)
.240*
(.058)
.234*
(.057)
.167*
(.052)
-.214
(.186)
.384*
(.178)
-.030
(.081)
-.004
(.003)
.001
(.016)
-.199
(.161)

.027
(.017)
-.056*
(.020)
.343*
(.031)
.340*
(.061)
.254*
(.061)
.238*
(.054)
-.233
(.195)
.197
(.188)
-.046
(.084)
-.013*
(.003)
.010
(.016)
-.097
(.166)

-2.574
1302.64 (df 576)
974.08 (df 564)
286

- 2.769
1394.96 (df 576)
967.16 (df 564)
286

Source: South Florida Sun-Sentinel panel survey of registered voters, wave one, July-August
1998.
Note: Table entries are unstandardized binomial regression coefficients (standard error in
parentheses). Coefficients with asterisks (*) are significant (2-tailed test) at p ≤ .05.
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Table 4
Predicting Changes in Issue and Group Support Awareness
Wave Two
Issue
Group Support
Awareness Awareness
Issue /Group Support
Awareness (t1)
Issue/Group Support
Awareness (t2)
Newspaper Exposure (t1)
TV News Exposure (t1)
Attention to Campaign:
Newspapers
Attention to Campaign:
TV News
Overall Attention
to TV Ads
Perceived Bush
Negativity
Perceived MacKay
Negativity
Gubernatorial Debate
Political Knowledge (t1)
Campaign Interest
General Political
Interest (t1)
Partisan Strength (t1)
Party ID/Republican (t1)
Party ID/Democrat (t1)
Gender/Female (t1)

.246*
(.036)
---

.428*
(.038)
---

-.049*
(.021)
.009
(.024)
.070
(.050)
.012
(.061)
.011
(.030)
.180*
(.041)
-.005
(.040)
---

-.066*
(.022)
.020
(.025)
.086
(.049)
.059
(.063)
-.025
(.032)
.054
(.043)
-.008
(.043)
---

.188*
(.038)
.184
(.091)
.087
(.072)
.020
(.066)
.040
(.237)
.263
(.223)
.028
(.103)

.115*
(.040)
.139
(.097)
.146
(.079)
.052
(.069)
-.265
(.249)
-.155
(.234)
-.043
(.108)

continued on next page

Wave Three
Issue
Group Support
Awareness Awareness
---

---

.204*
(.037)
.005
(.023)
-.021
(.026)
.078
(.048)
-.018
(.065)
.067
(.037)
.123*
(.044)
.025
(.050)
.073
(.045)
.156*
(.041)
.055
(.100)
.035
(.082)
-.012
(.075)
-.267
(.253)
.249
(.246)
-.016
(.114)

.228*
(.036)
.003
(.023)
-.008
(.026)
.070
(.048)
.063
(.065)
.025
(.037)
.157*
(.043)
.014
(.050)
.001
(.045)
.202*
(.041)
.129
(.099)
.110
(.083)
-.037
(.075)
.131
(.254)
.226
(.244)
-.127
(.114)
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Table 4, continued
Wave Two
Issue
Group
Awareness
Support
Age (t1)
Education (t1)
Race/Black (t1)
Constant
Null deviance
Residual deviance
N

-.004
(.004)
.035
(.020)
-.242
(.200)

.002
(.004)
.042*
(.021)
-.354
(.213)

-2.976
-3.238
666.97 (df 352) 818.97 (df 352)
389.47 (df 334) 461.49 (df 334)
285
285

Wave Three
Issue
Group
Awareness
Support
-.006
(.004)
.031
(.022)
-.091
(.223)

-.012*
(.004)
-.013
(.022)
-.003
(.224)

-2.127
-1.552
427.10 (df 286) 510.89 (df 286)
244.21 (df 267) 312.88 (df 267)
273
273

Source: South Florida Sun-Sentinel panel survey of registered voters, July-November 1998.
Note: Table entries are unstandardized binomial regression coefficients (standard error in
parentheses). Coefficients with asterisks (*) are significant (2-tailed test) at p ≤ .05. Independent
variables (left column) are measured in the same wave as the dependent variable unless
otherwise noted.

